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ROB LAWLOR 
 
TAUREK, NUMBERS AND PROBABILITIES 
 
 
ABSTRACT. In his paper, “Should the Numbers Count?” John Taurek imagines 
that we are in a position such that we can either save a group of five people, or 
we can save one individual, David. We cannot save David and the five. This is 
because they each require a life-saving drug. However, David needs all of the 
drug if he is to survive, while the other five need only a fifth each. 
Typically, people have argued as if there was a choice to be made: either 
numbers matter, in which case we should save the greater number, or numbers 
don't matter, but rather there is moral value in giving each person an equal 
chance of survival, and therefore we should toss a coin. My claim is that we do 
not have to make a choice in this way. Rather, numbers do matter, but it doesn't 
follow that we should always save the greater number. And likewise, there is 
moral value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, but it doesn't 
follow that we should always toss a coin. 
In addition, I argue that a similar approach can be applied to situations 
in which we can save one person or another, but the chances of success are 
different. 
 
 
KEY WORDS: Aggregation, numbers, probabilities, saving lives, Taurek, 
weighing goods. 
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If we can save the life of a single stranger or the lives of five strangers, 
but we cannot save all six, what should we do? Should we save the five, 
or should we toss a coin? In recent years, there has been a resurgence of 
interest in this question. Although John Taurek’s contribution is always 
acknowledged, his paper “Should the Numbers Count?” is often only 
mentioned in passing. If we do consider Taurek’s arguments in detail, 
however, we will see that Taurek’s arguments against aggregation are 
entirely without force. Nevertheless, I will also argue that Taurek’s paper 
is not entirely without merit, and I will argue in favour of Taurek’s claim 
that there is moral value in giving each person some chance of survival. 
 My paper will be in four parts. In the first I will consider Taurek’s 
paper in detail, to show that his arguments against aggregation are 
flawed and unconvincing. In the second part, I will argue in favour of the 
claim that there is moral value in giving each person a chance of 
survival, but will argue that this must be weighed against the value of 
saving the greatest number. In the third part, I will consider two possible 
objections to the position I have defended. Finally, in the fourth section, I 
will show that much of what we conclude about numbers can also be 
applied to probabilities. That is, the arguments considered in response to 
Taurek and his critics can also be appealed to in order to explain what 
we ought to do when faced with a situation in which we can try to save 
one person or another, but the chances of success are different in each 
case.  
 
 
Part one: Taurek and aggregation 
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John Taurek imagines that we are in a position such that we can either 
save a group of five people, or we can save one individual, David. We 
cannot save David and the five. This is because they each require a life-
saving drug. However, David needs all of the drug if he is to survive, 
while the other five need only a fifth. Most people’s natural intuition is 
that we should save the five. Taurek, however, argues that the way to 
show equal concern and respect for each person is to give each individual 
the same chance of survival. The way to do this, Taurek says, is to toss a 
coin. If we give the drug to the five, we give them a 100% chance of 
survival, but David has no chance. If we toss a coin, however, all have a 
50% chance of survival. 
In this paper, I will concede that there does seem to be some moral 
value in tossing a coin in such a situation, and will even concede that it 
may be that, if the difference in size between the two groups is small 
enough, we should toss a coin. I deny, however, that we should always 
toss a coin and, to deny this, I must deny the claim that the numbers 
should not count. In the cases where we should toss a coin, I claim that 
this is not because the numbers do not count, but because the moral 
value of tossing a coin may sometimes outweigh the moral value of saving 
the greater number (consider a group of 1,000,000 and a group of 
1,000,001). 
In addition to claiming that the best way to show equal concern and 
respect to each individual is to give each individual an equal chance of 
survival, Taurek also objects to the idea of aggregating harms. It may be 
natural for us to think five people dying is worse than one dying, but 
Taurek (1977, p. 303-4) asks, worse for whom? He writes: 
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For each of these six persons it is no doubt a terrible thing to die. 
Each faces the loss of something among the things he values most. 
His loss means something to me only, or chiefly, because of what it 
means to him. It is the loss to the individual that matters to me, 
not the loss of the individual. But should any of these five lose his 
life, his loss is no greater a loss to him because, as it happens, four 
others (or forty-nine others) lose theirs as well. And neither he nor 
anyone else loses anything of greater value than does David, 
should David lose his life. Five individuals losing his life does not 
add up to anyone’s experiencing a loss five times greater than the 
loss suffered by any one of the five. (Taurek, 1977, p. 307.) 
 
And regarding aggregation, Taurek writes 
 
The claim that one ought to save the many instead of the few was 
made to rest on the claim that, other things being equal, it is a 
worse thing that these five persons should die than that this one 
should. It is this evaluative judgement that I cannot accept. I do 
not wish to say in this situation that it is a worse thing were these 
five persons to die and David to live than it is or would be were 
David to die and these five to continue living. I do not wish to say 
this unless I am prepared to qualify it by explaining to whom or 
for whom or relative to what purpose it is or would be a worse 
thing. (Taurek, 1977, p. 303-4.) 
 
Taurek concedes that some will be “impatient with all this... They will 
insist that I say what would be a worse (or a better) thing, period.” But 
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Taurek insists: “I cannot give a satisfactory account of the meaning of 
judgments of this kind.”1 (1977, p. 304.) 
 Once we understand that Taurek’s concern is to show equal 
respect for each person, and that he therefore wants to give each person 
an equal chance of survival, his conclusion may not be quite as counter-
intuitive as it first seemed. 
Nevertheless, there are competing views which too are intuitively 
appealing – and don’t lead to the counter-intuitive conclusion that even if 
it is a choice between David and five million, we should toss a coin. 
Parfit, Kamm and Scanlon have all argued that showing equal concern 
and respect for all requires that more should count as more.2 
Parfit (1978, p. 301), for example, writes, “Why do we save the 
larger number? Because we do give equal weight to saving each. Each 
counts for one. That is why more count for more.” Similarly, Kamm 
(2000, p. 221) writes, “If the presence of each individual person would 
make no difference, this seems to deny equal significance to each 
person.” 
                                          
1 Taurek’s position becomes complicated here, because – immediately after 
claiming that he cannot make sense of judgements of this kind – he does in fact 
go on to make sense of judgements of this kind. At this stage, I will assume 
Taurek meant what he wrote when he claimed not to understand statements of 
this kind. At the end of this section, however, I will reconsider Taurek’s 
arguments in the light of the arguments that follow this claim. 
2 At least in cases when we are dealing with equal harms or losses on each side. 
I will not consider the question of whether a smaller harm to a number of people 
can outweigh a bigger harm to one person. I confess to not knowing what to say 
about this. On this issue, see Parfit (1978); Scanlon (1998, p. 229-241); Norcross 
(1997 & 1998); and Ridge (1998). 
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Kamm also presents the following argument. It would be worse if B 
and C die, than if B alone dies. Again, it is worse still if B, C and D die. 
This judgement is “made from a point of view outside of any person” 
(2000, p. 220), and she writes, “Nonconsequentialists as well as 
consequentialists, can evaluate states of affairs from an impartial point of 
view” (2000, p. 220). Kamm then argues that, given that B and C dying is 
worse than B alone dying, we can “substitute A for B on one side of the 
moral equation… and get that it is worse if B and C die than if A dies” 
(2000, p. 220). 
At this point, however, I suggest that we have a stalemate. Taurek 
will simply deny the premise on which Kamm’s argument is based. That 
is, he will deny that B and C dying is worse than B alone dying.  
People often find it difficult to believe that Taurek would deny this 
premise. For many it is natural to think that if death is bad for those that 
die then presumably it is worse if 5 die than if only one does.3 But 
remember that, as Kamm says, this judgement is “made from a point of 
view outside of any person”, and, as we have seen, Taurek claims that he 
cannot make sense of these judgements. According to Taurek, 
judgements of better or worse only make sense relative to a particular 
person’s point of view (or a particular goal). 
Thus, if it is a choice between B alone dying or B and C both 
dying, then Taurek will agree that the latter outcome is worse for C, but 
he will deny that it is worse, period. And, of course, Taurek will agree 
that we should save C, even if we can’t save B. But – for Taurek – this is 
not because two dying is worse than one dying. Rather, we should save C 
                                          
3 I thank Daniel Bristow and an anonymous referee for Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice for this point. 
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simply because it is better for C if C lives. Thus, Taurek would agree with 
Kamm regarding what we should do in this situation, but he can agree 
with this without accepting Kamm’s premise that it would be worse if B 
and C die than if B alone dies. And because he doesn’t accept this 
premise, Taurek will not be convinced by Kamm’s argument. 
On Taurek’s account, A dying and B and C living is the worst 
outcome for A, but the best for B and C. Likewise, A living and B and C 
dying is the best outcome for A, but the worst outcome for B and C. But – 
on Taurek’s account – neither outcome is better or worse than the other, 
period, because such statements simply don’t make sense. Presumably, 
when Kamm says that it would be worse if B and C die than if A alone 
dies, Taurek must claim that she is simply failing to say anything that he 
can make sense of. 
This does not show that Kamm is wrong. It shows only that her 
argument will not convince anyone who denies her premise. And Taurek 
does deny it. Similarly, Taurek will simply deny Parfit and Kamm’s 
claims that, by not counting more as more, he does not show equal 
respect and concern for each person.4 Thus, there is a stalemate. 
If we are to break this stalemate we need arguments that do not 
rely on premises that will be accepted only by those on one side of the 
debate. We need arguments that have some hope of winning converts 
from one side of the debate to the other, by showing that the position 
defended follows from premises that others accept, or by showing that 
the opposing view conflicts with moral intuitions we are not willing to 
reject. 
                                          
4 See Otsuka (2000, p. 291) for a defence against this objection, on Taurek’s 
behalf. 
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To his credit, this is exactly what Taurek attempts in “Should the 
Numbers Count?” I will argue, however, that his arguments fail.5 Taurek 
(1977, p. 294) claims that, “at least some of those who accept [that we 
should save the bigger group] fail to appreciate the difficulty of 
reconciling their thinking here with other convictions they are inclined to 
hold with even greater tenacity.” Thus, Taurek presents examples in 
which we have clear intuitions about what is permissible, and then 
attempts to argue that, if we share his convictions on this issue, we will 
not be able to reconcile this with our claim that we should save the larger 
group when faced with the dilemma we are concerned with here. 
I will argue that, in each case, Taurek’s arguments suffer from one 
or more of the following flaws. Either he fails to isolate the issue we are 
concerned with, or he moves from the question of what it would be best 
to do to questions of permissibility or obligation. 
Where he fails to isolate the issue, the most common problem is 
that his examples often involve implicit appeals to entitlements, which 
then render his “analogies” disanalogous. His second mistake is that he 
fails to see that there are often disparities between the level of sacrifice 
required in different cases (or he fails to see the significance of these 
disparities). Again, as a result, his “analogies” are not analogous. As a 
result, I suggest that there is no problem with reconciling our belief that 
numbers matter with the intuitions we have about the situations 
described. 
                                          
5 It will not be possible to go through each and every argument one by one in a 
short essay such as this. I hope, however, that once I have highlighted the errors 
in Taurek’s approach the reader will be able to return to the Taurek paper and 
see that these errors do recur throughout. 
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In the case of his first flaw, moving from questions of what would 
be best, to questions of what is permissible, Taurek argues for the claim 
that it is permissible to save David, and in doing so takes himself to be 
arguing against the claim that numbers count (for example, see 1977, p. 
301). But neither the claim that we don’t have an obligation to save the 
five, nor the claim that it is permissible to save the one, entails the 
conclusion that numbers do not matter. We could argue that it is 
permissible to save David, but insist that it would be better to save the 
five – because numbers do count. As such, the mere fact that it is 
permissible to save David – even if we accept this as a fact – does not 
support Taurek’s claim that numbers should not count. What Kamm and 
Parfit claim, and Taurek must deny, is that it would be better to save the 
five. If Taurek wants to oppose Parfit and Kamm here, it is not enough to 
claim that saving David is permissible. Rather, he must claim that saving 
David is just as good as saving the five, or that tossing a coin is the best 
option. In short, the question we need to ask is not, what is permissible, 
but what is the morally best action: to save the five, the one, or toss a 
coin? Questions of obligations and permissibility are further and separate 
issues. 
 Taurek argues that it doesn’t make sense to adopt a point of view 
outside of an individual, and to ask if a state of affairs is better or worse 
than another, period. Therefore, we cannot aggregate harms: “should any 
of these five lose his life, his loss is no greater a loss to him because, as it 
happens, four others… lose theirs as well.” (Taurek, 1977, p. 307.) And 
because we cannot aggregate, and therefore five deaths is not worse than 
one, then the way to show equal respect for each individual is to give 
each individual an equal chance of survival. Taurek uses the following 
Taurek/Page 10 
example in an attempt to show that the idea of aggregating harms is 
outrageous. 
Again, a drug can be used to save David or to save the five. It 
cannot save them all. This time though, Taurek supposes that David 
owns the drug. Taurek asks, would you try to persuade David to give the 
drug away? Taurek (1977, p. 299) argues that this “utilitarian reasoning 
would be comical if it were not so outrageous.” 
It is important, however, that we distinguish two issues. First 
there is the issue of the demandingness of utilitarianism, particularly in 
the light of David’s rights of ownership: “It is his drug” (Taurek, 1977, p. 
299). Second, there is the issue of aggregation. In the context of this 
paper, Taurek clearly takes himself to be arguing against the idea of 
aggregation. The intuitive appeal of his argument, however, comes from 
the fact that we would be making an unreasonable demand on David if 
we asked him to give up the drug for the sake of the five, especially 
considering his entitlement to the drug. 
In contrast, consider a case in which David has no such 
entitlement. Perhaps the six of them are ill, in the wilderness. By chance, 
they find a first aid kit, including some of the medicine they require. No 
one has any more claim to the drug than anyone else. 
It is far less absurd now to think that David might be moved by 
utilitarian reasoning. David may well think that it would be selfish of him 
to demand that his life should be given as much weight as the lives of the 
other five combined, all of whom will die without a fifth of the drug. The 
utilitarian reasoning here is neither comical nor outrageous. 
Thus, Taurek’s parody of utilitarianism is successful only to the 
extent that it shows that utilitarianism doesn’t recognise entitlements 
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and is too demanding. Neither of these claims offers the slightest support 
to the claim that harms cannot be aggregated. If Taurek’s argument 
shows anything, it shows only that, even if numbers do matter, they 
don’t matter as much as rights. 
Furthermore, even when Taurek does recognise that there is a 
question of demandingness, he fails to recognise the significance of this 
issue. Taurek (1977, p. 301) argues that if it is permissible for David to 
save himself, it must also be permissible for me to choose to save David 
over the five. That is, it must be permissible for me to take David’s 
perspective, and to do what is best for David – even if he is a stranger to 
me. 
First, I have already argued that if Taurek wants to show that 
numbers do not count, and that we cannot aggregate harms, he cannot 
do this merely by showing that it is permissible to save David. Rather, he 
would need to show that this option was just as good as saving the five, 
or that tossing a coin was the best option. Second, even if we do stick 
with permissibility, I am not convinced that Taurek reaches the right 
conclusion. Not only has he asked the wrong question, it is likely that he 
has also given the wrong answer. The fact that it is permissible for David 
to save himself does not entail that it is permissible for me to save David. 
Suppose Kamm is right, and B, C, D, E and F dying is (impartially) 
worse than A alone dying. The best thing to do would be to save the five, 
rather than the one. Thus, we ought to save the five. Here though, 
nothing has been said about what is demanded of you. We are assuming 
it is as easy to save five as to save one. The former does not require a 
greater sacrifice than the latter. Thus, if the best action available requires 
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no sacrifice on my part, we might plausibly claim that it is impermissible 
for me to do less.6 
The case is clearly different, however, if saving five requires a great 
sacrifice, such as a sacrifice of my own life, my arm (Taurek, 1977, p. 
302) or a friend (Taurek, 1977, p. 294-9).7 Morality might be thought to 
be unreasonably demanding if it insisted that it was impermissible for me 
to save myself (or my arm or my friend). The different level of 
demandingness makes all the difference.8 
Of course, if we take Taurek to mean that he cannot make sense of 
judgements made from the point of view outside of any person, then 
Taurek would deny the premise that saving the five is better than saving 
the one. However, this is irrelevant as Taurek’s purpose at this point is to 
address those who do believe we can aggregate harms. His aim is to show 
that they cannot reconcile this belief with their intuitions on other 
issues. It is to this argument that I am responding, and therefore it is 
acceptable for me to appeal to Kamm’s premise. 
As I suggested earlier,9 however, it is not clear what Taurek meant 
when he said “I cannot give a satisfactory account of the meaning of 
judgements of this kind” (Taurek, 1977, p. 304), given that he then goes 
on to give an account. One plausible interpretation would be to claim 
that he was not claiming that such judgements are meaningless. Rather, 
                                          
6 For a more detailed discussion of the relation between sacrifice and 
permissibility, see Mulgan (2001, p. 127-139). 
7 Also see Parfit (1978, p. 289-291). 
8 My argument here is influence by Parfit (1978, p. 287-292) and Mulgan (2001, 
p. 131, 137-8). 
9 See footnote 1 of this paper. 
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he was merely being modest, and suggesting that the account that he 
intended to give would not be perfect, but would suffice for further 
discussion. 
I will argue that this interpretation seems to jar with other claims 
made by Taurek. Nevertheless, I will also consider the implications of 
reading Taurek in this way, and argue that we can still reject Taurek’s 
arguments. 
If we interpret this claim as being nothing more than modesty, it 
would be difficult to explain why Taurek denies the claim that if one 
person dying is bad for that person then five people dying is worse. 
Also, we should consider the context in which Taurek makes this 
claim. Taurek writes: 
 
I grant that for each one of the five persons, it would be worse were 
David to survive and they to die than it would be if David were to 
die and the five to survive. But, of course, from David’s perspective 
the matter is otherwise… From my perspective, I am supposing in 
this situation that it does not really matter who lives and who dies. 
My situation is not worsened or bettered by either outcome… 
Some will be impatient with this. They will say it is true, no 
doubt, but irrelevant. They will insist that I say what would be a 
worse (or a better thing), period. It seems obvious to them that from 
the moral point of view, since there is nothing special about any of 
these six persons, it is a worse thing that these five should die 
while this one continues to live than for this one to die while these 
five continue to live. It is a worse thing, not necessarily for anyone 
in particular, or relative to anyone’s particular ends, but just a 
worse thing in itself. (1977, p. 304.) 
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And it is here, in response to this line of thought, that Taurek writes: 
 
I cannot give a satisfactory account of the meaning of judgements of 
this kind. 
 
In this context, this does seem to be a rejection of the reader’s insistence 
that Taurek tell them what would be a worse – or better – thing, period. 
He is refusing, precisely because he does not understand what they are 
demanding from him. Furthermore, this interpretation would seem to fit 
well with other claims that he makes throughout the paper. Consider the 
passages already quoted in this paper. In particular, remember that he 
states: 
 
I do not wish to say [it is or would be a wrong thing] unless I am 
prepared to qualify it by explaining to whom or for whom or relative 
to what purpose it is or would be a worse thing. (Taurek, 1977, p. 
304.) 
 
Also consider the following: 
 
Such reasoning seems appealing to many. I find it difficult to 
understand… (Taurek, 1977, p. 295.) 
 
Don’t you think David might demur? Isn’t he likely to ask: “Worse 
for whom?” (Taurek, 1977, p. 299.) 
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This is, of course, not to say that he thinks he is more valuable, 
period, than any of them, or than all five of them taken together. 
(Whatever could such a remark mean?) (Taurek, 1977, p. 300.) 
 
It is not my way to think of them as each having a certain objective 
value... (Taurek, 1977, p. 307.) 
 
This reflects a refusal to take seriously in these situations any 
notion of the sum of two persons’ separate losses. (Taurek, 1977, p. 
308.) 
 
I want to stress that it does not seem natural in such a case to 
attempt to add up their separate pains. (Taurek, 1977, p. 309.) 
 
Nevertheless, it is true that, immediately after claiming that he cannot 
make sense of judgements made from the point of view outside of any 
person, Taurek does in fact go on to give an account of what it might 
mean to make judgements of this kind. He writes: 
 
When I judge of two possible outcomes that the one would be worse 
(or better) for this person or this group, I do not, typically, thereby 
express a preference between these outcomes. Typically, I do not 
feel constrained to admit that I or anyone should prefer the one 
outcome to the other. But when I evaluate outcomes from an 
impersonal perspective (perhaps we may say from a moral 
perspective), matters are importantly different. When I judge that it 
would be a worse thing, period, were this to happen than were that 
to happen, then I do, typically, thereby express a preference 
between these outcomes. Moreover, at the very least, I feel 
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constrained to admit that I should have such a preference, even if I 
do not. It is a moral shortcoming not to prefer what is admittedly in 
itself a better thing to what is in itself a worse thing. (Taurek, 1977, 
p. 304-5.) 
 
Thus, on this account, I take it that these preferences are not merely on 
a par with normal personal preferences. After all, if I fail to prefer mint 
chocolate chip ice cream to vanilla ice cream, this is not a moral failing. 
You can prefer vanilla ice cream if you like. But, on this account, if we 
evaluate something from a moral perspective, we do think it is a moral 
shortcoming not to have the corresponding preference. On this account, 
Kamm or Parfit could say that five dying is worse than one dying, and 
therefore it is a moral shortcoming to fail to prefer the outcome in which 
the five are saved rather than the one. 
Thus, it seems that Taurek can make sense of judgements from a 
point of view outside of any person. If we interpret Taurek in this way, he 
can no longer resist the claim that five dying is worse than one dying by 
simply insisting that such statements don’t make sense. Rather, he has 
to show why, on the account given, it is not true that five dying is worse 
than one dying. In defence of his position, he writes: 
 
I could not bring myself to say to this one person, “I give my drug to 
these five because, don’t you see, it is a worse thing, a far worse 
thing, that they should die than that you should.” (Taurek, 1977, p. 
305.) 
 
But it is not clear whom this is likely to convince. Presumably, Kamm 
and Parfit would be perfectly happy saying such things. Parfit would say 
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to him, “Each counts for one, and therefore, I’m afraid, more must count 
for more, and so I must save the five.” And Kamm would explain, “if the 
presence of each individual person would make no difference, this seems 
to deny equal significance to each person. And so, I am afraid I must 
save the five.” 
 Taurek continues: 
 
I do not expect that David, or anyone in his position, should think it 
a better thing were he to die and these five others to survive than it 
would be were he to survive and they to die. (Taurek, 1977, p. 305.) 
 
But, of course, that is because David would, naturally, evaluate the 
situation from his own point of view. But, even if it is true that David 
would not prefer to die and for the five to survive, it doesn’t follow that he 
would object to the reasoning given above. He might say, “Of course, I 
would prefer to live, but I must concede that, if I was in your position, I 
would save the five rather than one, and I accept your decision.” And why 
would he say that? Because, although he thinks it would be better if he 
lived (viewing the situation from his own point of view), he can see that, 
from an impartial point of view, it would be better to save the five. 
 Commenting on the fact that David would prefer to live, Taurek 
writes: 
 
I do not think him morally deficient in any way because he prefers 
the outcome in which he survives and others die to the outcome in 
which they survive and he dies. (Taurek, 1977, p. 305.) 
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But, again, Taurek is ignoring the importance of the demands made on 
the agent. We can say that five dying is worse than one dying, but still go 
on to say that we would not consider David deficient for preferring the 
outcome in which he survives. We would justify this by arguing that 
morality would be too demanding if it insisted that David not only accept 
our reasoning, but actually prefer that outcome too. 
However, if we consider the case from the point of view of the 
rescuer who can save the one or the five, and has no special attachments 
to any of them, the situation is very different. If he prefers the situation 
in which one lives and five die, it does indeed seem plausible to claim 
that the rescuer is morally deficient.  
If the drug is David’s, we don’t consider him morally deficient if he 
keeps it to himself. To give the drug away would be to give up his life, 
and we argue that morality doesn’t require agents to make such great 
sacrifices. But the impartial rescuer doesn’t give up anything significant 
either way, so what reason do we have to deny that he is morally 
deficient if he saves the one, and lets five die.10 
Also, reconsider Kamm’s argument that if B and C dying is worse 
than B alone dying then we can conclude that B and C dying is worse 
than A dying. Originally, I argued that Taurek could resist this argument 
by denying the premise that B and C dying is worse than B alone dying. 
And, I argued, he could deny this premise because, on Taurek’s account, 
this statement simply didn’t make sense. 
On this new interpretation of Taurek, however, this option is not 
available to him. As we have seen, Taurek does offer an account to make 
sense of judgements of this sort, but rather tries to argue that it is not 
                                          
10 Again, see Mulgan (2001, p.131 and 137-8). 
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worse for five to die than for one. But how can he resist Kamm’s claim 
that B and C dying is worse than B alone dying. On Taurek’s account, 
the question we have to ask is: is a person morally deficient if they prefer 
B and C to die than for B alone to die? Presumably the answer must be 
yes, and so, we must accept Kamm’s premise. B and C dying is worse 
than B alone dying. And now it is less clear how Taurek can resist 
Kamm’s conclusion that B and C dying is worse than A dying. 
Ultimately, we have two interpretations of Taurek. On the first, he 
claims that judgements from an impartial point of view don’t make sense, 
but this is undermined by the fact that he himself does make sense of 
the judgements. And even if he fails to give a “satisfactory” account, he 
doesn’t give any good reason to think a satisfactory account is, in 
principle, impossible. And, on the second interpretation, according to 
which we can make sense of judgements from an impartial point of view, 
Taurek fails to show that five dying is not worse than one dying. 
Furthermore, the majority of the arguments against Taurek are effective 
on either interpretation. Thus, on either interpretation, Taurek’s 
arguments lack force. 
 
 
Part two: the moral value in giving each person an equal chance of 
survival 
 
My arguments, however, do not effect the claim that, in the 
circumstances described, there is some moral value in tossing a coin, 
thereby giving everyone an equal chance of survival. I see no way of 
arguing against this claim, and furthermore see no reason why we 
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should want to. On the contrary, I intend to defend this part of Taurek’s 
position. 
Many people, when presented with Taurek’s arguments for the 
first time, find it highly counter-intuitive, but, at the same time, they see 
that there is something positive in giving every person an equal chance of 
survival. When considering the case of one versus two, or even one 
versus four or five, people will often think this presents a real dilemma. 
As soon as we consider bigger disparities, one versus a million for 
example, all sense of there being a dilemma falls away. As Taurek 
presents his case, this is irrational. If one accepts his argument, we 
should see that we should toss a coin, regardless of how many lives are 
at stake. This looks implausible. Even if we were to defend the claim that 
we should toss a coin when it is one life against a million, it is 
implausible to think that this answer should be as easy to reach as when 
it is a case of one versus two. But, of course, this is the implication of 
Taurek’s arguments. If we can save group A or group B, but not both, we 
should toss a coin. We do not even need to know the numbers involved – 
according to Taurek, the numbers do not matter.11 If the groups are 
roughly the same size, or if one group is a billion times bigger than the 
other, it makes no difference. For Taurek it is clear what one should do. 
One should toss a coin. This doesn’t look plausible. 
It should be noticed, however, that those who simply think we 
should save the greatest number have a similar problem. If you think you 
should simply save the greatest number, it makes no difference whether 
it is one versus two or one versus a million. The answer should be just as 
                                          
11 Assuming that we are not considering the possibility of empty groups such 
that, for example, there is no one in group A. 
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clear in the first case as it is in the latter. But, again, this doesn’t seem 
plausible. Note, I am not denying that we should save the two instead of 
the one. I am merely denying that it is obvious that this is what we 
should do in the way that it is obvious that we should save the million 
instead of the one. 
Consider a new scenario. This time, we can save 1,000,000 or we 
can save 1,000,001. I agree with Parfit and Kamm that numbers do 
count, but it is not clear that the fact that we can save one extra life by 
saving the second group should be the deciding factor.12 Rather, it seems 
more likely to me that the moral value of giving each person an equal 
chance of survival can outweigh the moral good of saving the biggest 
group in this particular case.13 
Now consider this case in contrast with a case in which you can 
save one, or you can save two. Someone might argue that in both cases it 
is only one extra life that is at stake in either case, so why should we 
think that we should save the greater number in one case, but toss a 
coin in the other. The answer is simple. In the case where we can save 
one, or we can save two, the extra life we can save is weighed against the 
moral value of giving one person – the lone individual – some chance of 
survival. In the case where we can save 1,000,000 or we can save 
1,000,001, however, the one extra life we can save is weighed against the 
moral value of giving a million people a chance of survival. This explains 
why many will have the intuition that we should toss a coin in one case, 
but not the other. 
                                          
12 Furthermore, I don’t want to suggest that Parfit and Kamm would be 
committed to this position. It’s not clear to me that they need be. 
13 See also Parfit (1978, p. 300-1n). 
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A summary of my conclusion (regarding numbers) 
 
In short, if Taurek says that there is no value in saving the greatest 
number, but insists instead that we should simply toss a coin, giving 
everyone an equal chance of survival, he cannot make sense of the 
intuition that there is a real dilemma in some cases, but not others. 
Similarly, if Taurek’s critics deny that there is any value in giving 
everyone a chance of survival, but claim instead that we should simply 
save the biggest group, it also looks like they won’t be able to make sense 
of the intuition that there is a real dilemma in some cases but not 
others.14 However, if we acknowledge that there is some value to saving 
the greatest number, but also acknowledge that there is some value to 
giving each person an equal chance of survival, it is not irrational to see a 
dilemma in some cases but not in others. Thus, the position defended 
here, in which we give some weight to both issues, has the advantage of 
being able to explain and justify people’s intuitions on this matter. 
 
 
Part three: objections 
 
 
A weighted lottery? 
 
                                          
14 Unless, of course, they offer an alternative explanation for this intuition. 
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In response to these arguments, a number of people have suggested that 
we ought to have a weighted lottery? To some extent I am sympathetic to 
this view, as my main concern is to acknowledge that there is value in 
saving as many people as possible and also that there is value in giving 
each person a chance of survival, and a weighted lottery is indeed one 
way in which we can take both values into consideration. My concern, 
however, is that it doesn’t do so in the right way. 
Essentially, the idea is that if it’s a choice between saving one 
person or another, then we would toss a coin. On the other hand, if it’s a 
choice between saving one or saving five, then we have a lottery that is 
sensitive to the number of lives that are at stake on either side. So, for 
example, we might throw a die. If the number 1 is thrown, then we save 
the one, but if any other number from 2 to 6 is thrown, then we save the 
five. And so on, for other numbers. This way, everyone is given some 
chance of survival, but the fact that there is value in saving the greatest 
number is also taken into consideration by weighing the odds in favour of 
the larger group (and doing so in proportion to the difference in size.) 
So what is wrong with this approach? Consider again the situation 
in which you can save one, or you can save a million. Now suppose that 
we have a weighted lottery, and the result comes out in favour of saving 
the one. Of course, this result is not likely, but it is possible. In which 
case, we ought to save the one, and let the million die. (Otherwise, why 
did we bother with the lottery?). The procedure seems to have been fair. 
We ran the lottery, it was weighted according to the numbers, but as a 
matter of luck, the result was that a million people died. This seems to be 
the wrong result, and we could have avoided it by simply saving the 
million to begin with instead of running a lottery. And we could justify 
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this decision by saying simply that the moral value of saving a million 
lives (and making absolutely sure that we save them) outweighed the 
moral value of giving one person some chance of survival. Ultimately 
though, if your intuitions are not the same as mine, I will not have much 
more to say to try to convince you. My main point in this paper has just 
been to argue for the more modest claim that there are two values 
relevant to the scenarios Taurek discusses, not just one – and on this 
point we would be in agreement. Exactly how the two values should be 
incorporated into our moral judgements in these situations is a further 
question I do not intend to discuss further in this paper. 
 
 
A levelling down objection 
 
Another way in which some have responded to my arguments is to 
suggest that the principle of giving each person an equal chance of 
survival may invite a levelling down objection.15 
Consider the following situation; 
 
Suppose that I can try and save either Smith or Jones from 
drowning. If I opt to save Smith there is a 10% chance that I’ll 
succeed. If I opt to save Jones there is a 20% chance of succeeding. 
However, if I choose to try to save Jones, it is also possible to make 
                                          
15 These concerns were expressed by two anonymous referees for Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice. 
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the rescue attempt more difficult for myself by tying bricks to my feet, 
thereby reducing my chances of success to 10%.16 
 
The worry is that if our principle is that we should give each person an 
equal chance of survival, it seems that we ought to toss a coin, and if it 
lands on heads, I should do my best to save Smith. If it lands on tales, 
however, I should tie a couple of bricks to my feet, and then try to save 
Jones. This would give Smith and Jones an equal chance of survival. 
Clearly, this is absurd. 
 My response to this objection is simply to stress that Taurek was 
not looking for, or trying to defend, a general principle comparable, for 
example, to the utilitarian principle that we should maximise happiness. 
Rather, his focus was much narrower than that. He was simply trying to 
answer a particular question about a particular situation. Taurek writes: 
 
The situation is that I have a supply of some life-saving drug. Six 
people will all certainly die if they are not treated with the drug. But 
one of the six requires all of the drug if he is to survive. Each of the 
other five only requires one-fifth of the drug. What ought I to do? 
(Taurek, 1977, p. 294.) 
 
And it is only in relation to this particular question that Taurek claims 
that we ought to toss a coin, thereby giving everyone an equal chance of 
survival. This response is intended as an answer to the question: what 
ought I to do in this particular situation. It does not apply in other 
                                          
16 This scenario was suggested to me by one of the anonymous referees for 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 
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situations, unless they are relevantly similar. Likewise, this paper began 
with the following question: 
 
If we can save the life of a single stranger or the lives of five 
strangers, but we cannot save all six, what should we do? 
 
And it is in relation to this particular question that I agree with Taurek 
that there is value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, but 
also agree with Parfit and Kamm (among others) that there is also some 
value in saving the greater number. 
 By introducing a new situation in which the chances of survival 
are different, we have simply changed the subject and asked a different 
question. Equally, someone might say, what if one of the people is an evil 
mass-murderer who doesn’t deserve to live? Or what if the person who 
needs all the drug is on the verge of finding a cure for cancer? And so on. 
But these are just different questions, and therefore we should not be at 
all surprised if they require different answers. 
 Nevertheless, interesting issues arise when we change the 
circumstances by introducing probabilities. Furthermore, there are 
interesting parallels between this new question and the original question 
we started with. So, suppose that I can try to save either Smith or Jones 
from drowning, but I definitely cannot save both. If I opt to try to save 
Smith there is a 10% chance that I’ll succeed. If I opt to try to save Jones 
there is a 20% chance that I’ll succeed. What ought I to do? 
 
 
Part four: Taurek and probabilities 
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As we have seen, we clearly do not want to conclude that I should give 
each person an equal chance of survival. We could, however, still 
conclude that I should toss a coin to decide who we will try to save. If 
heads, I will try to save Smith, and if tails I will try to save Jones (without 
tying bricks to my feet). 
 However, many will object to this response. They will suggest that 
I am more likely to succeed if I try to save Jones than if I try to save 
Smith and, for this reason, I ought not to toss a coin. Instead, I ought to 
save Jones. I suspect that many would consider this to be the common-
sense answer. Furthermore, it does seem to be the parallel of the 
common-sense answer regarding numbers. In the original situation, the 
common-sense answer was that we should save the greatest number. In 
this new scenario, the common-sense answer is that we should try to 
save the person we are most likely to be able to save. Taurek rejected the 
common-sense answer in the first situation, but could he align himself 
with common-sense in this new situation? 
 In this section I will demonstrate that Taurek’s reasoning can be 
applied in this new situation as well as to the original, and I will argue 
that, if he is to be consistent, Taurek ought not to accept the common-
sense answer, but should again insist that I should toss a coin. 
 In this situation, the numbers are the same on either side, but the 
chances of success are different. So how would Taurek’s reasoning apply 
to this new scenario? What is better: a situation in which I am swimming 
out to try to help Smith, or a situation in which I am swimming out to try 
to help Jones? Presumably, Taurek will claim again that this question 
does not make sense to him. Rather, he will claim that it is better for 
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Jones (but worse for Smith) if I try to save Jones, but it is better for Smith 
(but worse for Jones) if I try to save Smith. For Taurek, it doesn’t make 
sense to say that one is better than the other, period.17 
 As such, it looks like Taurek should argue as follows: 
 
It would be better for Jones if I try to save Jones 
It would be better for Smith if I try to save Smith 
But we cannot say that one option is better than another, period 
Therefore, I ought to toss a coin to decide who I ought to save 
 
Again, however, I think that Taurek’s answer and the common-sense 
answer are both wrong, because they each focus on only one of the 
relevant factors. And again, we can give a number of different scenarios 
and stress that neither Taurek nor those who adopt the common-sense 
approach can make sense of the fact that we might see a dilemma in one 
case but not another. 
 For example, consider two more situations like the one just 
described, only this time the probabilities are as follows: 
 
a) 19.9% chance of saving Smith, 20% chance of saving Jones. 
b) 0.01% chance of saving Smith, 99.99% chance of saving Jones. 
                                          
17 Or, alternatively, he will concede that it does make sense, but will deny that 
trying to save one is better than trying to save the other. He will say “I could not 
bring myself to say to Smith, ‘I will try to save Jones because, can’t you see, he 
has a 20% chance of survival, so it is better that I try to save him.’ I do not think 
that Smith would agree that this is better. He would prefer that I try to save him, 
and I would not think him morally deficient…” See Taurek, 1977, p. 305. And 
my objection to this line of argument will be the same as before. 
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Should I simply try to save Jones, or should I toss a coin? Should we give 
the same answer in both cases? Taurek – it seems – should be committed 
to tossing a coin in both cases. The common-sense answer is committed 
to saving Jones in both cases. If you think I should toss a coin in 
scenario a) but ought to save Jones in scenario b) then – unless you have 
some other explanation – I suggest that this is because you agree that (in 
this situation) there is value in my trying to save the person I am most 
likely to save successfully, but you also see that there is some value in 
tossing a coin such that there is at least some chance that I will try to 
save Smith. In scenario b), the latter outweighs the former, and in 
scenario a) the former outweighs the latter. 
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